

## Revision of the Three Documents on National Security Significance and Highlights

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### 1 Security Environment Surrounding Japan

- **Traditional assumption:** overwhelming U.S. military superiority → **Current assumption:** expansion of China's approach anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment. China's rapidly strengthening air-naval and ballistic/cruise missile strike capabilities and cyber/electronic warfare capabilities have made the superiority of U.S. forward-deployed forces and force projection capabilities less self-evident. The focus is on securing the U.S. military's forward deployment and operational access within the war zone.
- **Rapid changes in the military balance between Japan and China:** A strategic environment in which air and maritime superiority cannot be secured is envisioned. Military challenges facing Japan also include: (1) low intensity/hybrid conflicts: violation of maritime rights and interests due to intrusion of fishing vessels and oceanographic research vessels; acts of demonstration by military vessels, submarines, helicopters, aircraft, etc.; and (2) medium/high intensity conflicts: destruction of bases (U.S. military and SDF) and logistics infrastructure (ballistic and cruise missiles, special forces, cyber attacks). (3) Medium/high intensity conflicts: destruction of bases (U.S. military and Self Defense Forces) and logistics infrastructure (ballistic/cruise missiles, special forces, cyber attacks), attacks and invasions of Japan's island regions, etc.
- To counter these complex threats, it is necessary to build an effective defense posture that seamlessly enables Japan to strengthen its law enforcement capabilities, expand its defense capabilities, and jointly cope in the Japan-U.S. alliance at all stages from peacetime to contingency. It is also necessary to develop a defense posture that is premised on cross-domain operational capabilities, including cyber, space, electromagnetic domains, and robotics, in addition to traditional land, sea, and air.

### Trends in Defense Expenditures of the U.S., China, India, ASEAN, Japan, and Australia

In millions of US dollars (current USD)

	2010	2015	2020	2025 (projected value)	2030 (projected value)
USA	738,005	633,829	778,397	855,028	1,007,837
China	105,523	196,539	257,973	427,147	612,127
India	46,090	51,295	72,937	109,174	160,868
ASEAN6	26,699	35,134	45,942	60,663	83,701

Japan	54,655	42,106	51,970	(57,160)	(64,421)
Australia	23,217	24,046	27,301	35,688	44,335

Source: Projections based on SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2021)\*

\*After 2025, estimated as U.S. (3.2%), China (1.9%), India (2.6%), ASEAN (1.4%), Japan (0.9%), and Australia (1.85%).

## 2 Toward Enhancing Integrated Defense Capabilities

- The National Defense Program Outline formulated in December 2019 proposed a "multidimensional integrated defense force" that integrates space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains through flexible and sustained integrated operations of the SDF. While the direction of this defense force concept is correct, its priorities, resource allocation, and operational posture must be constantly reconfigured in response to changes in the security environment. Specifically, emphasis should be placed on the following matters, which are premised on integrated operations.
- **GSDF:** Emphasize high mobility and readiness, especially in the southwest area (with air/sea cover capability), and enhance special operations capabilities in amphibious operations, airborne, and cyber/electromagnetic domains. Significantly enhance land-based standoff firepower, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles.
- **Air Self-Defense Force:** To acquire and maintain air superiority in key operational airspace, the **Air Self-Defense Force will enhance its** high-performance multi-role fighter aircraft, as well as aerial refueling aircraft, AWACS (airborne warning and control system), and electronic warfare capabilities. To prepare for high-intensity situations, air bases will be made more resilient, and facility areas in various regions will be made more flexible for use. Also, a significant increase in the number of unmanned aerial vehicles will enhance alert and surveillance capabilities.
- **Maritime Self-Defense Force:** To strengthen the "Active Denial" strategy, a new convoy (more compact and multifunctional hull), littoral combat, anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare, and patrol capabilities will be enhanced. To enhance underwater warning and surveillance and combat capabilities, submarine forces and equipment will be enhanced, as well as the development and operation of unmanned submersibles.
- **Integrated Missile Defense (AMD) capability:** Need to enhance integrated missile defense capability in response to North Korea's enhanced missile capabilities (simultaneous launch and impact capabilities, progress in concealment, development of medium- and long-range missiles and cruise missiles) and China's deployment of medium-range and cruise missiles PAC-3/SM-3/new introduction In addition to the multilayered defense by the Aegis system, defense capabilities against all types of trans-air threats (cruise, irregular-orbit, and hypersonic missiles) will be expanded. Also, the deployment of intermediate-range missiles (INF) by the U.S. will be added for consideration from the perspective of contributing to AMD, denial capability, and anti-

A2/AD capability. Construction of a comprehensive system to upgrade Japan-U.S. joint detection, tracking, and shoot-down capabilities.

- **Standoff Defense and Counterattack Capabilities:** (Current Approach) Dealing with the threat from a distance outside the threat zone (e.g., anti-ship strikes) -> (Future Option) [Against North Korea] Constrain North Korea's offensive capabilities by destroying fixed ground targets and repeating offensive postures. Need to coordinate strategy with U.S. strike capability and South Korean kill chain. Pursue within the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan-U.S.-ROK security cooperation. [China] Acquisition of wide-area strike capability through expansion of standoff defense capability. Ability to strike against Chinese maritime forces, deployed assets, and fixed military targets.

### 3 Military applications of advanced technology and research and development

- Advances in advanced technologies (unmanned systems and robotics, hypersonic systems, high-power energy, quantum technology, etc.) in the defense sector have the potential to revolutionize the conventional concept of national defense and operations. Unmanned systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and drones are already in full-scale operation in anti-terrorist operations, alert surveillance, and operations in high-risk war zones. In the future, with the application of AI and robotics, humans may break out of military systems that have been embedded in a "ring of judgment" and deploy autonomous military operations and even robot-to-robot combat → "Singularity (Singularity) on the Battlefield.
- With the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, its long borders and vast exclusive economic zone, and the difficulty of securing Self Defense Force personnel due to the declining birthrate and aging population, the introduction of unmanned systems and robotics should be actively considered in our country.
- Missile defense, response to saturation attacks, decoy identification, urgency assessment, measures against airspace invasion: scramble operations, response to intrusion of unmanned systems, security of surrounding sea areas and response to attacks on islands (including gray zone situations), integrated logistics capabilities with land, sea, and air transportation + resupply capabilities (3D printer), defense It is important to implement and apply the system to medical care, triage, response to NBC situations, response to large-scale disasters, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations (HA/DR), etc.
- Strengthening of technological foundations, bridging basic/applied research (overcoming the valley of death) bridge research, and full-scale studies in strategy, tactics, R&D, etc. at the National Security Bureau, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Acquisition Agency, domestic think tanks and companies are needed → integration of technology and defense policy and operational concepts.

#### **4 Japan-U.S. Alliance: Strengthening U.S. Forward Deployment and Japan-U.S. Joint Operations in the A2/AD Environment**

- The greatest challenge facing the U.S.-Japan alliance is the expansion of the Approach Detection and Area Denial (A2/AD) environment due to China's modernization of its military capabilities. The rapid strengthening of China's air-naval and ballistic/cruise missile strike capabilities and cyber/electronic warfare capabilities has made the superiority of U.S. forward-deployed and force-projection capabilities less self-evident. The U.S.-Japan alliance must counter the rising costs of maintaining the status quo over the East Asian maritime order and Taiwan, and the difficulty of maintaining air and sea superiority and succession capabilities in the event of a conflict.
- To this end, the basic policy of the U.S.-Japan alliance must be to ensure the forward deployment of U.S. forces in the A2/AD environment and to strengthen joint U.S.-Japan operations. It is necessary to deploy the most advanced attack assets of the U.S. Navy and Air Force and maintain the readiness of the U.S. Marines for immediate deployment. Also, the deployment of additional assets (long-range anti-ship and anti-surface missiles) that would enable standoff attacks should be actively considered. In addition, joint planning, information sharing, and joint training should be strengthened to enable Japan-U.S. joint operations at all stages, from warning and surveillance to gray zone situations and conflicts.
- Japan needs to strengthen the resiliency of U.S. bases in Japan so that they can function effectively as force projection platforms in the Western Pacific even under the A2/AD environment. The current HNS is mostly for facility maintenance (barracks and housing), benefits, utilities, etc., but HNS and other budgets should be used to specifically strengthen the resilience of US military facilities (runways, port reinforcement, restoration capability, power and network infrastructure, cyber protection, and increased installation of underground facilities).

#### **5 Expand security cooperation with partner countries in the Indo-Pacific**

- In order to promote the free and open Indo-Pacific concept from a strategic dimension, partnerships with partner countries in the region should be organized and promoted by purpose and issue area. (1) Partnerships to support the U.S. regional presence: South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore; (2) Partnerships to support the maritime security order: (1) plus India and ASEAN maritime countries; (3) Partnerships for denuclearization, non-proliferation, and destabilization of the Korean Peninsula: the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia; (4) Support for capacity building in maritime security: the Philippines and maritime countries led by Vietnam; and (5) Partnerships to expand defense in the ASEAN region. (5) Expansion of

joint HA/DR training centered on the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM Plus), (6) Expansion of legal arrangements (Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)) to enable the SDF to operate throughout the Indo-Pacific Ocean → From the above perspectives, revision of the "Vientiane Vision" was considered. (5) Expansion of joint HA/DR training, focusing on the SDF in the Indo-Pacific region, (6) Expansion of legal arrangements (Visiting Forces Agreement: VFA) to enable the SDF to operate throughout the Indo-Pacific region

- Strengthening relations with the Philippines will be particularly important. Currently, the U.S. is strengthening VFA under the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Force Agreement (ECFA), expanding infrastructure that can be used and ported by U.S. forces, improving the capabilities of maritime security authorities, and deploying Marines on a rotational basis. The Philippines is a desirable alternative site for decentralized deployment in an A2/AD environment and is also a strategic point connecting Japan-Taiwan-Philippines. Develop strategic infrastructure (security dual-use airports, ports, and roads) in Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines + Vietnam, to support maritime security and vigilance surveillance capabilities → (joint strategy with Foreign Affairs, METI, JICA/JBIC, etc. is needed)

## 6 Expansion of defense technology base, international joint research and equipment transfer

- **Strengthen the defense technology base and establish a mechanism to accelerate technological innovation**: As unmanned systems, robotics, nanotechnology, IOT, and AI are implemented in the military field, the need to secure technological superiority in strategically important fields. Strengthening the Defense Acquisition Program (increasing R&D investment), strengthening cooperation with domestic companies/universities, and strengthening international joint research systems (with DARPA, etc.). Conduct research and development on the state of future warfare from both technology and policy perspectives.
- **Create successful examples of defense equipment transfer**: Zero joint development based on the "Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfer" (April 2014); continued failure of exports of domestically produced finished products (Example of failure: "Souryu-type submarine" → Australia, P1 patrol aircraft → UK, FPS-3 air defense radar → Thailand. Successful example: FPS-3, Philippines). The main reasons are high cost, customization capability, and lack of lobbying power. Need to build on successful examples of industry-government cooperation from US-2 (India and Greece) and C-2 (UAE and NZ) that are under negotiation.

## 7 Infrastructure for Defense Expenditure

- **Financial foundation for drastically strengthening defense capabilities**: "Japan has expressed its determination to drastically strengthen its defense capabilities and to secure a substantial increase in defense expenditures to back this up" (Japan-U.S. Summit Joint Statement). From

the viewpoint of defense force development based on strategicity, (1) priority allocation to ensuring effective defense capabilities (standoff defense capability, comprehensive missile air defense, unmanned asset defense capability, cross-area operations capability, command and control and intelligence-related functions, mobile deployment capability, and sustainability and resilience), (2) future technology, on the assumption that it is compatible with Japan's defense concept (2) Investment in R&D and securing the defense industrial and technological base in line with the timeline of innovation, based on the premise of conformity with Japan's defense concept.

- **Efforts to improve and optimize the financial base**: reorganization of the SDF for strategic defense force development (optimization of force composition), optimization of equipment systems (review of legacy equipment systems, clarification of priorities, review of projects (suspension of operation of equipment of declining importance, review of projects with low cost effectiveness), common specifications, optimization, streamlining procurement, utilization of long-term contracts, reduction of the risk of development cost escalation), emphasis on R&D based on security priorities, optimization of R&D processes (spiral method, block approach, modularization). (review of legacy equipment systems, clarification of priorities, review of projects, review of projects with low cost-effectiveness, review of projects with low cost-effectiveness, review of projects with low cost-effectiveness, commonization of specifications, optimization, efficiency of procurement, use of long-term contracts, reduction of the risk of rising development costs), emphasis on R&D based on security priorities, constant efforts to optimize R&D processes (spiral, block, modular)